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FROM NATIONAL STANDARDS TO JUSTICIABLE
RIGHTS: ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL AND
ECONOMIC GUARANTEES THROUGH
CHARTER OF RIGHTS REVIEW
MARTHA JACKMAN*
RItSUMit
Le Comit6 des Nations Unies sur les droits 6conomiques, sociaux et culturels a
recommand6 dans son examen de 1998 de la conformit6 du Canada au Pacte interna-
tional relatif aux droits iconomiques, sociaux et culturels que les droits sociaux et
6conomiques soient reconnus par l'interm6diaire d'un examen de la Charte can-
adienne des droits. Dans cet article, l'auteur traite du bien-fond6 et de la viabilit6 d'une
telle approche. La premiere partie de ce document d6crit les droits sociaux et
6conomiques qui sont 6noncds dans la D6claration universelle des droits de l'homme
et qui sont r6affirm6s dans le Pacte international. La seconde partie de cet article
examine les r6centes orientations des politiques f6d6rales et provinciales en mati~re
d'aide sociale et sugg~re que la disparition des normes nationales en mati~re d'aide
sociale qui a suivi l'abrogation du R6gime d'assistance publique du Canada en 1996
a augment6 de mani~re dramatique le besoin de la reconnaissance judiciaire et de
l'application des droits sociaux et 6conomiques au Canada. Dans la troisi~me partie
de ce document, l'auteur traite de la possibilit6 d'utiliser la Charte comme un moyen
d'appliquer les droits sociaux et 6conomiques en faisant 1'examen de lajurisprudence
des tribunaux canadiens d'instance inf6rieure et de la Cour supreme du Canada dans
ce secteur. L'auteur conclut que, tant dans l'esprit que le texte, la Charte peut en effet
6tre un m6canisme pr6cieux d'application des obligations 6nonc6es dans le Pacte
international.
Introduction
The fiftieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights' provides an
important opportunity to examine' Canada's record in implementing the guarantees
contained in the Universal Declaration and subsequent international human rights
* © Martha Jackman. Martha Jackman is a Professor at the Faculty of Law of the University of
Ottawa. The author thanks Vince Calderhead, John Currie, Judith Keene, Allan McChesney and
Bruce Porter for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of the paper.
1. GA Res. 217(1I), UN GAOR, 3d Sess., Supp. No. 13, UN Doc. A/810 (1948) 71 [hereinafter Universal
Declaration].
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agreements ratified by Canada. In light of the recent discussions between the federal
government and the provinces relating to the terms of a new "social union", Canada's
international commitments in the field of social and economic rights, and in particular
those set out under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights,2 merit special attention. In a paper marking the 50th anniversary of the
Universal Declaration, Professor William Schabas comes to the following conclusion
with respect to the current status of social and economic rights in Canada:
Fifty years after its adoption, the economic, social and cultural rights set out in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights are subject to ongoing violation within
Canada, as the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has pointed out.
Judges can and should rectify the situation by adopting a judicial approach to indi-
visibility, in effect reading in to the Charter and the other relevant instruments
human rights that had been marginalised in the past 3
Professor Schabas' assessment refers to the findings of the United Nations Committee
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,4 in its periodic review of Canada's perfor-
mance under the International Covenant, in June 1993. While the U.N. Committee
prefaced its 1993 report5 by commenting favourably on the general strengthening of
human rights protection in Canada through the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms6 and other domestic human rights legislation, 7 it went on to question the
2. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16 December 1966, 993 U.N.T.S.
3, Can. T.S. 1976 No. 46 (entered into force 3 January 1976) [hereinafter International Covenant].
3. W.A. Schabas, "Freedom from Want: How Can We Make Indivisibility More Than a Mere Slo-
gan?", paper presented to "Building a Human Rights Agenda for the 21s" Century: A Practical Cele-
bration of the 50 Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights", Ottawa, Ontario, 1-3
October 1998, at 18-19.
4. Under Articles 16 and 17 of the International Covenant, States Parties are required to submit reports
"on the measures which they have adopted and the progress made in achieving the observance of the
rights recognized herein" to the U.N. Economic and Social Council. These periodic reports are
reviewed by the U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which is responsible for
interpreting the provisions of the International Covenant. For a general discussion of the Interna-
tional Covenant, see L. Lamarche, Perspectives occidentales du droit international des droits
iconomiques de la personne (Brussels: Bruylant, 1995); M. Craven, The International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995). For a discussion of the
implementation measures under the International Covenant see General Comment No. 9: The
Domestic Application of the Covenant, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UN
Doc. E/C 12/1998/24; P. Alston, "The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights" in P.
Alston, ed., The United Nations and Human Rights: A Critical Appraisal (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1992) 473 at 490-491.
5. United Nations Economic and Social Council, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant:
Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Canada),
Geneva, 10 June 1993, E/C 12/1993/5; reproduced in (1994) 20 C.H.R.R. C/1 [hereinafter Conclud-
ing Observations, 1993].
6. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11
[hereinafter Charter].
7. Supra note 5 at C16.
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depth of Canada's commitment to the International Covenant, particularly in view of
the failure to address the persistence and disparate impact of poverty in Canada,
notwithstanding the country's enviable economic situation.8 In terms of the role of the
courts in ensuring respect for the guarantees contained in the International Covenant,
the U.N. Committee criticized the characterization of social and economic rights in
Canadian court decisions as mere policy objectives, rather than as enforceable rights
under the Charter. In order to improve Canada's compliance with the International
Covenant, the U.N. Committee urged Canadian judges to adopt a broad and purposive
approach to the Charter, so as to provide appropriate remedies against social and
economic rights violations. 9
Canada's compliance with the International Covenant was again subject to scrutiny
by the U.N. Committee in December 1998. In its 1998 report' 0 the Committee
reiterated the concerns raised in its 1993 review of Canada's performance under the
International Covenant. The Committee criticized the position taken by provincial
governments in defending against Charter-based social and economic rights
challenges in the following terms:
The Committee has received information about a number of cases in which claims
were brought by people living in poverty (usually women with children) against
government policies which denied the claimants and their children adequate food,
clothing and housing. Provincial governments have urged upon their courts in these
cases an interpretation of the Charter which would deny any protection of Covenant
rights and consequently leave the complainants without the basic necessities of life
and legal remedy.II
The Committee was equally critical of the lower courts' approach to the Charter in
the social and economic rights sphere, stating in this regard:
The Committee is deeply concerned to receive information that provincial courts in
Canada have routinely opted for an interpretation which excludes protection of the
right to an adequate standard of living and other Covenant rights. The Committee
notes with concern that the courts have taken this position despite the fact that the
Supreme Court of Canada has stated, as has the Government of Canada before this
Committee, that the Charter can be interpreted so as to protect these rights. 12
The following paper will discuss the desirability and viability of judicial recognition
of social and economic rights through Charter review, as has been recommended by
the U.N. Committee. The first part of the paper will briefly describe the social and
8. Ibid. at C/7--C/8.
9. Ibid.- at C/9.
10. United Nations Economic and Social Council, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant:
Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Canada),
Geneva, 4 December 1998, E/C 12/I/Add.31 [hereinafter Concluding Observations, 1998].
11. Ibid. at para. 14.
12. Ibid. at para 15.
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economic rights set out in the Universal Declaration and reaffirmed in the Interna-
tional Covenant. The second part of the paper will review the recent direction in federal
and provincial welfare policy and will suggest that the loss of national welfare
standards, following the repeal of the Canada Assistance Plan,3 in 1996, has dramat-
ically increased the need for judicial recognition and enforcement of social and
economic rights in Canada. The third part of the paper will consider the potential of
the Charter as a vehicle for enforcing social and economic rights, through an exami-
nation of Canadian lower court and Supreme Court of Canada case law in this area.
The paper will conclude that, in both spirit and text, the Charter can indeed serve as
an invaluable mechanism for implementing the obligations set out under the Interna-
tional Covenant - obligations to which Canadian governments are committed under
international law, although they may chose to ignore them at home.
1. CANADA'S SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RIGHTS UNDERTAKINGS
UNDER THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION AND THE
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT
On December 10, 1948, Canada was among the 48 members of the United Nations
General Assembly voting in favour of the adoption of the Universal Declaration,
thereby endorsing a new international vision of the role of governments in fostering
and promoting human rights as a collective value. 14 Article 1 of the Universal
Declaration recognizes that "All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and
rights", and Articles 2 and 7 guarantee enjoyment of the rights set out in Universal
Declaration without distinction or discrimination based on race, sex, property and
birth or other status, among other grounds. Article 25(1) provides that:
Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being
of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and
necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment,
sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances
beyond his control.15
Other social and economic rights recognized under the Universal Declaration include
the right to social security and to the realization of social and economic rights
indispensable to a person's dignity and the free development of his or her personal-
ity; 16 the right to work, to free choice of employment, to protection against unemploy-
ment and to remuneration ensuring "an existence worthy of human dignity and
13. R.S.C. 1985, c.C-l, as am.
14. For an account of Canada's role in the adoption of the Universal Declaration, see W.A. Schabas,
"Canada and the Adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights" (1998) 43 McGill L.J.
403.
15. Supra note 1.
16. Ibid., Art. 22.
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supplemented, if necessary, by other means of social protection"; 17 and the right to
education. 18
The social and economic guarantees set out in the Universal Declaration were given
more concrete expression in the International Covenant which, along with its sister
covenant on civil and political rights, 19 was adopted by the U.N. General Assembly
in 1966 and ratified by Canada in 1976 after lengthy discussions with the provinces.
Unlike the Universal Declaration, which was intended to stand as a general statement
of principle,20 the International Covenant creates binding obligations for those states
which, like Canada, are parties to it.21 The Preamble of the International Covenant
declares that: "the ideal of free human beings enjoying freedom from fear and want
can only be achieved if conditions are created whereby everyone may enjoy his
economic, social and cultural rights, as well as his civil and political rights." Article
2(1) of the International Covenant provides that: "Each State Party to the present
Covenant undertakes to take steps ... to the maximum of its available resources, with
a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the
present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of
legislative measures." Article 2(2) guarantees enjoyment of the rights contained in the
International Covenant without discrimination "of any kind as to race, colour, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth
or other status."
Article 6 of the International Covenant guarantees "... the right to work, which
includes the right of everyone to the opportunity to gain his living by work which he
freely chooses or accepts..." Article 9 recognizes "... the right of everyone to social
security, including social insurance."22 Article 10 declares that "The widest possible
protection and assistance should be accorded to the family ... particularly .. while it is
responsible for the care and education of dependent children..." Article 11 (2), in terms
similar to the Universal Declaration, guarantees: "the right of everyone to an adequate
standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and
17. Ibid., Art. 23.
18. Ibid., Art. 26.
19. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 19 December 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, Can.
T.S. 1976 No. 47,6 I.L.M. 368 (entered into force 23 March 1976).
20. It is now accepted by many legal scholars, however, that the Universal Declaration has achieved the
status of customary international law and hence applies to Canada to the same extent as conventional
international law: see for example J. Claydon, "International Human Rights Law and the Interpreta-
tion of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms" (1982) 4 Supreme Court L.R. 287 at 288-89.
21. See P. Alston & JJ. Quinn, "The Nature and Scope of States Parties' Obligations Under the Interna-
tional Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights" in Alston, supra note 4.
22. These rights are reiterated in their application to children under the Convention on the Rights of the
Child, 20 November 1989, Can. T.S. 1992 No. 3; UN Doc, A1RES144125 (entered into force 2 Sep-
tember 1990). In particular, Article 26 of the Convention sets out "for every child the right to benefit
from social security, including social insurance.... See generally L.J. Leblanc, The Convention on
the Rights of the Child: United Nations Law-Making on Human Rights (Lincoln: University of
Nebraska Press, 1995).
(1999) 14 Journal of Law and Social Policy
housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions." Finally, Article 28
of the International Covenant provides that its provisions "shall extend to all parts of
federal States without any limitations or exceptions."
Taken together, the provisions of the Universal Declaration and the International
Covenant impose an obligation on Canadian governments to ensure that Canadians
enjoy the full protection and benefit of fundamental social and economic rights, which
are not only essential to human dignity and equality, but upon which the enjoyment
of more traditional civil and political rights depends.
2. THE Loss OF NATIONAL STANDARDS UNDER THE CANADA
ASSISTANCE PLAN
Until 1996, the Canada Assistance Plan (CAP) 23 provided the statutory framework
for federal and provincial compliance with the basic terms of the International
Covenant. Enacted in 1966, CAP authorized federal contributions, on a shared-cost
basis, towards a wide range of provincial welfare programs and services, including
social assistance. In order to be eligible for federal funding under CAP, the provinces
were required to meet a number of conditions. In particular, CAP required that social
assistance be provided to any person in need, regardless of the reasons of the need for
support; that levels of assistance take into account the basic requirements of recipients,
in terms of food, shelter, clothing, fuel, utilities, household supplies and personal
requirements; that welfare services continue to be developed and extended; that
provincial residency requirements and waiting periods not be imposed; and that appeal
procedures from decisions relating to assistance be made available. 24 By requiring the
provinces to comply with these CAP conditions in order to receive federal welfare
funding, the federal government effectively ensured that all Canadians had access to
a minimum level of income support and services on relatively equal terms and
conditions in all parts of the country. CAP thereby gave effect to the core social and
economic entitlements under the Universal Declaration and the International Cove-
nant, including the basic right to social security and to an adequate standard of living
for oneself and one's family.25
In what has been widely described as the most important social policy change in almost
thirty years, the 1995 federal Budget Implementation Act 26 repealed CAP and its
shared-cost approach to federal welfare funding in favour of a new block transfer
under the Federal-Provincial Fiscal Arrangements and Federal Post-Secondary Edu-
cation and Health Contributions Act:27 the Canada Health and Social Transfer
23. Supra note 13.
24. lbid, s.6.
25. Universal Declaration, supra note 1, Art. 25(1); International Covenant, supra note 2, Art. 9.
26. Budget Implementation Act, 1995, S.C. 1995, c. 17. Section 31 of the Act provides that no payment
shall be made under CAP after April 1, 1996, and section 32 sets March 31, 2000 as the date of
CAP's repeal.
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(CHST).28 In contrast to the broad preventive and remedial objectives of CAP, the
stated purpose of the CHST is "to finance social programs in a manner that will
increase provincial flexibility. '29 Of the national conditions previously imposed under
CAP, only the prohibition against provincial residency requirements continues to
apply under the CHST. Whereas federal CAP transfers matched provincial welfare
spending, annual CHST amounts are set in advance and the transfer is not in fact tied
to any type or level of provincial spending. 30
Given the current context of social policy reform in Canada, there is no question that
abandoning CAP conditions relating to need, adequacy and rights of appeal in favour
of "increase[d] provincial flexibility" under the CHST represents a significant step
backwards in terms of Canadian compliance with the International Covenant.
Enhanced provincial flexibility has become a euphemism, in Canada, for a series of
welfare reforms which are highly regressive and discriminatory in their impact on
individuals and families in need of assistance. For example, recent program reforms
in a number of provinces have heightened distinctions between beneficiaries who are
deemed to be "employable" and those who are not. Individuals identified as being
"employable", including sole support mothers in some provinces, have been subject
to more onerous conditions for receipt of assistance, have been forced to participate
in workfare programs, and have had their benefit levels significantly reduced. 31 In
contrast to the entitlement approach underlying CAP, an approach consistent with the
International Covenant's goal of full realization of social and economic rights through
legislative measures, the program orientation promoted by the unconditionality of the
CHST revives stereotypic and discriminatory distinctions between the "deserving"
and the "undeserving poor", and encourages reduction of welfare rolls instead of
reduction of poverty as the primary focus of welfare policy. 32 In short, by abandoning
27. R.S.C. 198 c.F-8, as am. [hereinafter Federal-Provincial FiscalArrangements Act].
28. See generally M. Jackman, "Women and the Canadian Health and Social Transfer: Ensuring Gender
Equality in Federal Welfare Reform" (1995) 8 C.J.W.L 371; S. Day & G. Brodsky, Women and the
Equality Deficit: The Impact of Restructuring Canada's Social Programs (Ottawa: Status of Women
Canada, 1998).
29. Supra note 27, s.13(1)(a).
30. Ibid., ss.14-16.
31. At the federal level the new National Child Benefit program also discriminates against welfare-poor
versus working-poor families. See National Council of Welfare, Child Benefits: Kids are Still Hun-
gry (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1998); F. Stairs, "The National Child
Benefit Clawback: An Update" Social Safety News 21 (October 1998) 10; J. Pulkingham, G. Ter-
nowetsky & D. Hay, 'he New Canada Child Tax Benefit: Eradicating Poverty or Victimizing the
Poorest?" The Monitor 4:1 (1997); National Anti-Poverty Organization, Bill C-36 and the National
Child Benefit: NAPO's Presentation to the House of Commons Committee on Finance (Ottawa:
National Anti-Poverty Organization, April 1996).
32. See generally National Anti-Poverty Organization, Poverty and the Canadian Welfare State: A
Report Card (Ottawa: National Anti-Poverty Organization, June 1998); C. Girard & L. Lamarche,
"lvolution de la sdcurit6 sociale au Canada: Le mise a l'6cart progressive de l'6tat providence Can-
adien" (1998) 13 J.L. & Social Pol'y 95; K. Scott, Women and the CHST A Profile of Women
Receiving Social Assistance in 1994 (Ottawa: Status of Women Canada, 1998) at 57; Day &
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the CAP funding model and conditions in favour of unconditional provincial transfers
under the CHST, the federal government has relinquished its ability to ensure that
Canada is in compliance with the terms of the International Covenant.
Not surprisingly, while it was in force, CAP figured prominently in Canada's periodic
reports on Canadian compliance with the International Covenant. In relation to the
steps taken by Canada to ensure the right to an adequate standard of living under
Article 11 of the International Covenant, for example, Canada's Second Report refers
primarily to CAP as a source of standards and federal assistance to the provinces for
the payment of social allowances to persons in need.33 In the portion of the Second
Report dealing with provincial measures to implement the International Covenant,
extensive reference is also made to CAP-funded provincial welfare programs. 34 As
ProfessorCraig Scott has pointed out,35 the repeal of CAP amounts to a "deliberately
retrogressive measure" in clear contravention of the requirement under Article 2 of
the International Covenant that: "[E]ach State Party ... take steps ... to the maximum
of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization
of the rights recognized in the ... Covenant by all appropriate means....1-36
The concern of the U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in this
regard is reflected in the fact that, shortly after the tabling of the 1995 Budget
Implementation Act, the Committee granted a special hearing to a coalition of Cana-
dian anti-poverty groups to present a brief on the implications of the repeal of CAP in
terms of Canada's obligations under the International Covenant.37 The Committee
reiterated its concerns about the loss of CAP in its Concluding Observations on
Canada's compliance with the International Covenant, in December 1998.38 The
Brodsky, supra note 28; National Council of Welfare, Another Look at Welfare Reform (Ottawa:
Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1997); National Anti-Poverty Organization, Moni-
toring the Impacts on Social Assistant Recipients of Welfare Cuts and Changes: An Overview
(Ottawa: National Anti-Poverty Organization, October 1996).
33. Multiculturalism and Citizenship Canad International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights - Second Report of Canada on Articles 10-15 (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1992) at
5; UN Doc. E/1990/6/Add. 3.
34. Ibid. at 38-146.
35. C. M. Scott, "Covenant Constitutionalism and the Canada Assistance Plan" Constitutional Forum
6:3 (Spring 1995) 79 at 82.
36. Supra note 2.
37. See Charter Committee on Poverty Issue National Anti-Poverty Organization & National Action
Committee on the Status of Women, Re: The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Rights and Proposed Legislation by Canada (Bill C-76) to Eliminate the Canada Assistance
Plan, (CAP) - Presentation to the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights by Non-Gov-
ernmental Organizations from Canada (Ottawa: National Anti-Poverty Organization, May 1995).
For a discussion of this initiative and its legal significance, see supra note 35.
38. Supra note 10. The Committee's findings were informed by presentations and briefs submitted by
several Canadian non-governmental organizations, including: Charter Committee on Poverty Issues,
Submission to the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights by the Charter Committee on
Poverty Issues Relating to the Review of the Third Report of Canada (Toronto: Charter Committee
on Poverty Issues/Centre for Equality Rights in Accommodation, November 1998); National Anti-
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Committee began its review of Canada's Third Report39 by referring to the federal
government's own earlier submissions on the role of CAP vis-a-vis the International
Covenant:
The replacement of the Canada Assistance Plan (CAP) by the Canada Health and
Social Transfer (CHST) entails a range of adverse consequences for the enjoyment
of Covenant rights by disadvantaged groups in Canada. The Government informed
the Committee in its 1993 report that the CAP set national standards for social wel-
fare, required that work by welfare recipients be freely chosen, guaranteed the right
to an adequate standard of living, and facilitated court challenges to federally-
funded provincial social assistance programmes which did not meet the standards
prescribed in the Act.40
The Committee went on to criticize the impact of the changes under the CHST on
social and economic rights in Canada:
In contrast, the CHST has eliminated each of these features and significantly
reduced the amount of cash transfer payments provided to the provinces to cover
social assistance. It did, however, retain national standards in relation to health
under CHST, thus denying provincial "flexibility" in one area, while insisting upon
it in others. The delegation provided no explanation for this inconsistency. The
Committee regrets that, by according virtually unfettered discretion in relation to
social rights to provincial Governments, the Government of Canada has created a
situation in which Covenant standards can be undermined and effective account-
ability has been radically reduced. 41
Foremost among the Committee's recommendations to ameliorate Canada's compli-
ance with the International Covenant was the reestablishment of "a national pro-
gramme with designated cash transfers for social assistance and social services which
include universal entitlements and national standards, specifying a legally enforceable
Poverty Organization, The 5 01 h Anniversary of the UN Declaration: A Human Rights Meltdown in
Canada - Submission of the National Anti-Poverty Organization to the Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights on the Occasion of the Consideration of Canada's Third Report on the
Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Ottawa:
National Anti-Poverty Organization, November 1998); National Association of Women and the
Law, Canadian Women and the Equality Deficit A Presentation to the International Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Ottawa: National Association of Women and the Law,
November 1998); and Low Income Families Together, The Ontario People's Report to the United
Nations on Violations of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the
Province of Ontario, Canada (Toronto: Low Income Families Together, November 1998).
39. Department of Canadian Heritage, The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights - Third Report of Canada covering the period for articles 6-9 (December 1987 to September
1994) for articles 10-15 (September 1992 to September 1994) (Ottawa: Public Works and Govern-
ment Services Canada, 1997) [hereinafter Third Report].
40. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding Observations, 1998, supra note 10
at para. 19.
41. Ibid. At para. 23 of its Concluding Observations, 1998 the Committee also remarked on the particu-
larly harsh impact which the repeal of CAP and social welfare program cuts has had on women and
in particular single mothers.
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right to adequate assistance for all persons in need, a right to freely chosen work, a
right to appeal and a right to move freely from one job to another. '42
In the amendment to the Federal-Provincial Fiscal Arrangements Act establishing the
CHST, the federal government undertook to enter into discussions with the provinces
to develop a set of "shared principles and objectives" for CHST-funded welfare
programs and services. 43 The Federal Plan for Gender Equality, developed in prepa-
ration for the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing, also suggested that the
federal government would address gender-related concerns in negotiations with the
provinces over new program conditions to be included in the CHST.44 This commit-
ment was reiterated in Canada's Third Report on Canada's compliance with the
International Covenant.45 To date, however, no such federal-provincial agreement has
been reached.46 Instead, the provinces have taken the lead in discussions relating to
the future direction of Canadian social policy, and have expressed unequivocal
objection to any attempt by the federal government to re-introduce conditionality into
federal social program transfers.47 In light of the provinces' position and continued
inaction by the federal government, it appears highly doubtful that any new national
program conditions will be adopted which would re-establish a right to social security
within the meaning of the International Covenant, whatever the outcome of the current
social union talks.
3. THE CHARTER'S POTENTIAL IN THE SPHERE OF SOCIAL AND
ECONOMIC RIGHTS
The loss of national standards under CAP; the policy and program orientation rein-
forced by the CHST; and the tone of current federal-provincial discussions relating to
the "social union", lend even greater urgency to the call for judicial enforcement of
42. Ibid. at para. 40.
43. Supra note 27, s. 13(3).
44. Status of Women Canada, Setting the Stage for the Next Century: The Federal Plan for Gender
Equality (Ottawa: Status of Women Canada, 1995) at 23.
45. Supra note 39 at 21.
46. For a discussion of the reasons why national standards and harmonization of provincial social policy
are unlikely absent the compulsion of the federal spending power, see M. Mendelson, The Provinces'
Position: A Second Chance for the Social Security Review? (Ottawa: Caledon Institute of Social Pol-
icy, 1996); C.E. Forget, "The Harmonization of Social Policy" in M. Krasnick, Fiscal Federalism
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press/Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development
Prospects for Canada, 1986) at 97.
47. See generally J. Bryden, "Social Union Puts Chr6tien on Hot Seat" Ottawa Citizen (7 December
1998) A5; G. Gherson, "Ottawa Ready to Accept Social Union" National Post (2 December 1998)
Al, A7; Provincial/Territorial Council on Social Policy Renewal, Progress Report to Premiers -
Report No. 3 (August 1998); Provincial/Territorial Council on Social Policy Renewal, New
Approaches to Canada's Social Union: An Options Paper (April 1997); Provincial/Territorial Coun-
cil on Social Policy Renewal, Progress Report to Premiers - Report No. 2 (July 1997); and 1996
APC Provincial-Territorial Working Group on Social Policy Reform and Renewal, Issues Paper on
Social Policy Reform and Renewal: Next Steps, August 1996.
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international social and economic rights guarantees through Charter review. What
then is the Charter's potential as a mechanism for enforcing Canada's commitments
under the International Covenant? And what are the obstacles to Charter-based social
and economic rights claims?
In principle the Charter, and in particular the right to life, liberty and security of the
person under section 7 and the right to equal protection and equal benefit of the law
under section 15, provide a solid basis for challenges to social and economic rights
violations. The Supreme Court of Canada has emphasized that the Charter must be
read in a broad and purposive manner, which promotes the underlying values, com-
mitments and aspirations of Canadian society.48 The Charter should therefore be
interpreted in a way which reflects and reinforces Canada's longstanding social
welfare traditions; the importance individual Canadians attach to social and economic
security as an underlying social value; the preeminence of health care, income support
and other social services in our social and political landscape; and our collective vision
of the state and its responsibility for protecting and promoting individual social and
economic well-being.
Throughout our history Canadians have accepted an active role for governments in
the pursuit of social and economic objectives, and have seen state intervention as
necessary for ensuring human rights. We not only understand that liberty is not
necessarily incompatible with state power, we expect governments to act affirmatively
to support and expand individual rights by providing the means for their exercise. As
Frank R. Scott expressed it in an early commentary on the Canadian Bill of Rights:
In the early struggles for liberty, it was nearly always the state or some part of it that
was the enemy ... Hence the very strong tradition grew up ... that it was liberty
against government that mattered.
... This concept, however, has had in recent times to be supplemented by another
idea, which I may call liberty through government. Certain human rights, of great
value to a number of people, can only be realised through government action.49
Such arguments have been made with even greater force in connection with the
Charter. As Rod Macdonald puts it: "The most important right for the majority of
Canadians is not a right to be free from certain kinds of governmental activity, but
rather the right to be free to benefit equally from the advantages that organized
government fosters. ' 50 This positive approach to the Charter is reinforced by the
48. Skapinkerv. Law Society of Upper Canada, [1984] 1 S.C.R. 357 at 366,9 D.L.R. (4th) 161,53 N.R.
169; Canada (Director of Investigation & Research, Combines Investigation Branch) v. Southam
Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 at 155, 11 D.L.R. (4th) 641, 55 N.R. 241 [hereinafter Hunter v. Southam];
R. v. Big MDrug Mart., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 at 344, 18 D.L.R. (4th) 321,58 N.R. 81; Thibaudeau v.
R., [1995] 2 S.C.R. 627 at 642, 124 D.L.R. (4th) 449, 182 N.R. 1.
49. F.R. Scott, "Expanding Concepts of Human Rights" (1960) 3 Can. Bar J. 199; reprinted in F.R.
Scott, Essays on the Constitution (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977) 353 at 356-57.
50. R.A. Macdonald, "Postscript and Prelude - The Jurisprudence of the Charter: Eight Theses" (1982) 4
Supreme Court L. Rev. 321 at 344.
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language of section 36(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, which entrenches an express
commitment by the federal and provincial governments to: "promoting equal oppor-
tunities for the well-being of Canadians"; "furthering economic development to reduce
disparity of opportunities"; and "providing essential public services of reasonable
quality to all Canadians." Interpreted in light of section 36 and the expectations of
Canadians in regard to personal security and equality, the Charter should be a
significant avenue for the pursuit of social and economic rights claims.
a) Social and Economic Rights Claims Before the Lower Courts
While, in theory, the Charter should provide a solid basis for challenges to laws,
policies and government programs which infringe social and economic rights, in
practice few cases involving such issues have been decided by the courts, and even
fewer have been successful. 51 In the case of section 7, lower courts have characterized
claims brought by low income plaintiffs in relation to health care, housing, unemploy-
ment insurance, and social assistance as "economic" in nature, and therefore beyond
the scope of the Charter. The courts have based this conclusion on the legislative
history of section 7, and in particular on the failure to include the right to property
along with the right to life, liberty and security of the person under section 7. Typical
is the reasoning of the British Columbia Supreme Court in Brown v. British Columbia
(Minister of Health), where a challenge to the government's refusal to include the
AIDS drug AZT under the province's pharmacare regime was rejected on the basis
that section 7 does not protect against economic deprivations or guarantee benefits
which might enhance life, liberty or security of the person. 52
In the case of section 15 of the Charter, health care, housing, social assistance and
other social and economic rights-related claims have foundered on a formalistic
reading of the Charter's equality guarantees. In some cases the courts have upheld
discriminatory legislation on the grounds that everyone was being treated equally. In
other cases, the courts have failed to recognize poverty as a prohibited ground of
discrimination; disadvantage suffered by the claimants has been attributed to sources
outside the impugned legislation; or the courts have refused to find government action
sufficient to ground a Charter claim. In Masse v. Ontario (Ministry of Community and
Social Services), for example, the Ontario Divisional Court rejected a section 15
challenge to a 20 percent cut in provincial welfare rates on the grounds that claimants
were receiving rather than being deprived of a benefit; that there was no legal
obligation on the government to provide social assistance in the first place; and that
poverty was not a prohibited ground of discrimination under the Charter.53
51. See generally J. Keene, "Claiming the Protection of the Court: Charter Litigation Arising from Gov-
ernment 'Restraint" (1998) 9 NJ.C.L; Day & Brodsky, supra note 28 at 79-108; M. Jackman, "Poor
Rights: Using the Charter to Support Social Welfare Claims" (1993) 19 Queen's L.J. 65.
52. (1990), 66 D.L.R. (4th) 444 at 467, 469; 42 B.C.L.R. (2d) 294,48 C.R.R. 137 [hereinafter Brown].
53. (1996), 134 D.L.R. (4th) 20 at 59-60, 89 O.A.C. 81,40 Admin. L.R. (2d) 87, leave to appeal to Ont.
C.A. refused (1996), A.C.W.S. (3d) 1228, 40 Admin. L.R. (2d) 87n, leave to appeal to S.C.C.
refused 207 N.R. 78, 97 O.A.C. 240, 39 C.R.R. (2d) 375n [hereinafter Masse].
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Underlying the judicial unwillingness to accept Charter-based social and economic
rights claims are a number of concerns. First, the courts do not want the Charter to be
seen as imposing a duty on governments to remedy all forms of social and economic
inequality. As the Newfoundland Court of Appeal expressed it, in rejecting a challenge
to discrimination against public housing tenants under provincial residential tenancies
legislation, in Newfoundland and Labrador Housing Corporation v. Williams: "The
Charter should not be seen as a cornucopia from which all good things flow ... It is
not a perfect world. Full equality will never be accomplished. It is not possible and
probably not desirable." 54
An important corollary to this view is the notion that, where the state does open the
"public purse" to dispense social programs or benefits in the interests of remedying
disadvantage, the courts should be reluctant to use the Charter to intervene. In the
courts' view, governments are attempting to address complex problems in the face of
severe fiscal constraints and must be granted a wide margin of manoeuvre in setting
up and administering programs. Plaintiffs who avail themselves of social programs
and benefits do so fully cognizant of the attendant disadvantages and should not later
be heard to complain. As the Manitoba Court of Appeal asserts in Fernandes v.
Director of Social Services (Winnipeg Central), in rejecting a claim by a disabled
welfare recipient for an increase in his benefits to enable him to remain living at home
rather than in a hospital, "[T]he particular choices of a particular individual are not
generally to be considered when those choices affect the public purse. '55
Finally, judges are preoccupied by the potential implications of recognizing social and
economic entitlements under the Charter at an institutional level. Whether tacitly or
explicitly, judges express concern that, should they involve themselves in fundamental
issues of social and economic policy in addressing Charter-based social and economic
rights claims, they will risk usurping the democratic authority of elected governments.
As the Qu6bec Superior Court expressed it, in rejecting a Charter challenge to
discriminatory workfare requirements under Qu6bec's social assistance regime, in
Gosselin v. Quibec (Procureur giniral):
La Charte ne fait pas obstacle i la souverainet6 du parlement ... s'il fallait y voir des
obligations positives ce serait les tribuneaux qui, par leur approbation ou non,
viendraient ultimement d6terminer les choix de l'ordre politique ... Or, pareil r6le
n'est pas donnd au pouvoir judiciaire par la Charte. Les tribuneaux ne doivent pas
substituter leur jugement en mati~re sociale et 6conomique au jugement des corps
16gislatifs 61us A cette fin.56
54. Newfoundland & Labrador Housing Corporation v. Williams (1987), 62 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 269 at
277, 190 A.P.R. 269, 38 D.L.R. (4th) 355 [hereinafter Williams].
55. Fernandes v. Manitoba (Director of Social Services (Winnipeg Central)) (1992), 93 D.L.R. (4th) 402
at 407 78 Man. R. (2d) 172, 16 W.A.C. 172, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused 99 D.L.R. (4th) vii,
151 N.R. 393n, 92 Man. R. (2d) 77n [hereinafter Fernandes].
56. [ 1992] R.J.Q. 1647 at 1670 [hereinafter Gosselin].
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Taken together, such reservations have led the lower courts to take an extremely restrictive
view of the Charter as a vehicle for pursuing social and economic rights claims.
b) Social and Economic Rights Claims in the Supreme Court of Canada
While the lower courts have been largely unsympathetic to social and economic rights
challenges under the Charter, several factors suggest that Charter-based claims for
domestic recognition and enforcement of international social and economic rights
guarantees may receive a more favourable reception before the Supreme Court of
Canada. As a general matter, the Supreme Court has recognized that the international
human rights treaties which Canada has ratified are an important point of reference in
interpreting and applying the Charter. In Re Public Service Employee Relations Act,
former Chief Justice Dickson argued that:
The content of Canada's international human rights obligations is, in my view, an
important indicia of the meaning of "full benefit of the Charter's protection." I
believe that the Charter should generally be presumed to provide protection at least
as great as that afforded by similar provisions in international human rights docu-
ments which Canada has ratified. 57
In a recent keynote conference address, Chief Justice Lamer asserted that "the Charter
should be, and has been, understood as part of the international human rights move-
ment."' 58 Justice Lamer went on to argue that "by looking to international treaties and
the jurisprudence of international human rights bodies in the interpretation of domestic
human rights norms ... judges raise the profile of those international treaties and further
the creation of a human rights culture." In similar terms, Justice LaForest has
suggested that:
... We are absorbing international legal norms affecting the individual through our
constitutional pores. ... Thus our courts - and many other national courts - are
truly becoming international courts in many areas involving the rule of law. They
will become more so, and they continue to rely on and benefit from one another's
experience. Consequently, it is important that ... national judges adopt an interna-
tional perspective. 59
This growing openness to international human rights norms as a guide to Charter
interpretation is particularly promising in the social and economic rights sphere, since
the legitimacy and importance of such rights is fully recognized and accepted in the
international law context. 60
57. Reference Re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alta.), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313 at 349, 38 D.L.R.
(4th) 161, [1987] 3 W.W.R. 577; Slaight Communications v. Davidson, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038 at
1056-57, 59 D.L.R. (4th) 416, 93 N.R. 183.
58. Rt. Hon. A. Lamer, "Enforcing International Human Rights Law: The Treaty System in the 21st
Century" (Address to York University, 22 June 1997) [unpublished] at 6.
59. Hon. G. LaForest, "Ihe Expanding Role of the Supreme Court of Canada in International Law
Issues" (1996) 34 Can. Y.B. Int'l L. 89 at 98 & 100-101.
60. See, for example, the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, UN Doc. AJCONF.157/24
(1993) Part I, para. 5; reproduced in (1994) 14 H.R.L.J. 352.
From National Standards to Justiciable Rights
i) Section 7 of the Charter
The Supreme Court has also been less inclined than Canadian lower courts to
categorize and to dismiss automatically cases involving social and economic related
interests. While it has not yet been called upon to directly address the issue of whether
the right to life, liberty and security of the person protects fundamental social and
economic interests guaranteed under the International Covenant, the Supreme Court
has put the lower courts' narrow approach to section 7 in social and economic rights
cases into serious question. In her decision in Singh v. Canada (Minister of Employ-
ment and Immigration), for instance, Justice Wilson referred to the Law Reform
Commission of Canada's argument that "the right to security of the person means not
only protection of one's physical integrity, but the provision of necessaries for its
support."16 1 And, in Irwin Toy v. Quibec (A.G.), the Court refused to read section 7 as
excluding all interests of an economic nature. Rather it suggested that "economic
rights fundamental to human life or survival" may be included under section 7. The
Court argued in this regard:
Lower courts have found that the rubric of "economic rights" embraces a broad
spectrum of interests, ranging from such rights, included in various international
covenants, as rights to social security, equal pay for equal work, adequate food,
clothing and shelter, to traditional property-contract rights. To exclude all of these at
this early moment in the history of Charter interpretation seems to us to be precipi-
tous. We do not, at this moment choose to pronounce upon whether those economic
rights fundamental to human life or survival are to be treated as though they are of
the same ilk as corporate-commercial economic rights. 62
In his dissenting opinion in the New Brunswick Court of Appeal decision in J.G. v.
Minister of Health and Community Services,63
a case involving a challenge to inadequacies in New Brunswick's civil legal aid
program, now Supreme Court Justice Bastarache also put forward a more expansive
reading of section 7, asserting "that the policy of human rights has evolved interna-
tionally and domestically and that both the protective and integrative functions of
human rights must be constitutionally accepted under the Charter".64
As Justice Bastarache explained:
In modern societies, rights cannot be fully protected by preventing government
intrusions in the lives of citizens. Some rights in effect require governmental action
for their integration into the concept of fundamental justice. It is also important to
61. [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177 at 207, 17 D.L.R. (4th) 422, 58 N.R. 1, citing Law Reform Commission of Can-
ada, Medical Treatment and the Criminal Law (Working Paper 26) (Ottawa: Law Reform Commis-
sion of Canada, 1980) at 6.
62. [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927 at 1003-1004, 58 D.L.R. (4th) 577, 94 N.R. 167 [hereinafter Irwin Toy].
63. (14 March 1997), 2/96/CA (N.B.C.A.) [hereinafter J.G.]. The J.G. case involved a section 7
challenge to the province of New Brunswick's failure to provide legal aid to parents in child appre-
hension proceedings taken against them.
64. Ibid. at 12.
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look at individual international instruments with regard to the text of companion
instruments. While section 9(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights seems to limit "liberty" and "security" to their physical aspect, for instance,
section 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ... speaks of "the right to
security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age and
other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond [one's] control. 65
Leaving aside the issue of the relevance of the framers' intent in Charter interpreta-
tion,6 6 Justice Bastarache's reading of section 7 in J.G. and the Supreme Court's
analysis in Irwin Toy are far more consistent with the legislative history of section 7
than the blanket dismissal of social and economic rights claims by the lower courts.
The proposal, during the Special Joint Committee hearings on the Constitution in
1981, to add a right to "enjoyment of property" to section 7 was defeated because of
concerns that entrenching property rights in the Charter could interfere with environ-
mental and other land use regulation, public ownership and regulation of resource-
based and other industries and restrictions on foreign ownership of land.67 While it is
therefore accurate to suggest that the omission of property rights from section 7 was
intended to forestall Charter-based objections to government regulation of private
property, it is incorrect to read the legislative history of section 7 as a basis for
rejecting all individual social and economic rights claims, as the lower courts have
so far done.
ii) Section 15 of the Charter
In the case of section 15 of the Charter, the recent Supreme Court decisions in Eldridge
v. British Columbia (Attorney General)68 and Vriend v. Alberta69 are extremely
significant. In its judgements in the two cases, the Court clearly rejected the formalistic
approach to equality adopted by most lower courts in dealing with Charter cases
65. Ibid.
66. In his decision for the Court in Reference Re s.94(2) of Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] 2 S.C.R.
486, 24 D.L.R. (4th) 536, 63 N.R. 266, Chief Justice Lamer suggests that, while evidence of legisla-
tive history is admissible in Charter interpretation, it is in no way determinative. As Justice Lamer
cautioned, at 509:
..Even at this early stage in the life of the Charter, a host of issues and questions have
been raised which were largely unforeseen ... If the newly planted "living tree" which
is the Charter is to have the possibility of growth and adjustment over time, care must
be taken to ensure that historical materials, such as the Minutes of Proceedings and
Evidence of the Special Joint Committee do not stunt its growth.
67. Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons on the Constitution of Canada,
Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, First Session of the Thirty-second Parliament, 1980-1981,
Issues 44-46 (23, 25, 27 January 1981). For a discussion of the legislative history of section 7 with
regard to property rights see J. McBean, "The Implications of Entrenching Property Rights in Section 7 of
the Charter of Rights" (1988) 26 Alta L. Rev. 548; A. Alvaro, "Why Property Rights Were Excluded from
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms" (1991) 24 Can. J. of Political Science 309.
68. [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624, 151 D.L.R. (4th) 577, 218 N.R. 161 [hereinafter Eldridge].
69. [19981 1 S.C.R. 493, 156 D.L.R. (4th) 385, 224 N.R. 1 [hereinafter Vriend].
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involving social and economic rights claims. In doing so, the Court put the notional
distinction between government action and inaction, upon which the dichotomy
between social and economic and civil and political rights generally rests, into serious
doubt.70
The respondents in Vriend argued that because the case involved a legislative omis-
sion, that is, the failure by the Alberta government to include sexual orientation as a
prohibited ground of discrimination under the province's Individual's Rights Protec-
tion Act, the Charter did not apply. Speaking for a unanimous Court on section 15,
Justice Cory argued that there was no legal basis for drawing a distinction between
positive government action and legislative omission in the context of Charter-based
claims. As he explained:
McClung J.A.'s position that judicial interference is inappropriate in this case is
based on the assumption that the legislature's "silence" in this case is "neutral". Yet,
questions which raise the issue of neutrality can only be dealt with in the context of
the s. 15 analysis itself. Unless that analysis is undertaken, it is impossible to say
whether the omission is indeed neutral or not. Neutrality cannot be assumed. To do
so would remove the omission from the scope of judicial scrutiny under the Char-
ter.7 l
Justice Cory held that the language of section 32(1) did not support the "narrow view"
that there must be some affirmative exercise of legislative authority in order to bring
the government's decision within the purview of the Charter.72 He suggested instead
that the application of the Charter "is not restricted to situations where the government
actively encroaches on rights", 73 and that the issue whether the Charter imposes an
affirmative obligation on Parliament and the legislatures remains an open one.74 In
coming to this conclusion, Justice Cory pointed to Justice LaForest's decision for the
Court in Eldridge, where the latter also found that the question whether the Charter
"oblige[s] the state to take positive actions, such as provide services to ameliorate the
symptoms of systemic or general inequality" has yet to be decided. 75 The Court went
on to conclude that the Alberta government's failure to ensure gays and lesbians equal
protection of the provincial human rights regime offended section 15 of the Charter.
Government efforts to avoid Charter liability by pointing to broader social circum-
stances rather than government action as the real source of inequality or discrimination
experienced by the claimants, were also rejected by the Supreme Court in Eldridge.
The respondents in Eldridge countered the appellants' section 15 challenge to the B.C.
70. For an in-depth analysis of this aspect of the Eldridge and Vriend decisions, see B. Porter, "Beyond
Andrews- Substantive Equality and Positive Obligations After Eldridge and Vriend' Constiuaional
Forum 9:3 (1998) 71.
71. Supra note 69 at 532.
72. Ibid. at 532.
73. Ibid. at 532-533.
74. Ibid. at 534.
75. Supra note 68 at 678.
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government's failure to provide interpreter services within the provincial medicare
system by arguing that any disadvantage suffered by the Deaf was owing, not to
provincial health and hospital insurance legislation, but to their deafness. Rather than
imposing a disadvantage, the respondents asserted, the provincial medicare scheme
provided a benefit: access for all B.C. residents to medical and hospital services free
of charge. The respondents claimed that, since the Deaf were no worse off than before
the introduction of universal medicare, no violation of section 15 had occurred. 76
In his decision for the unanimous Court, Justice LaForest rejected this reasoning. In
response to the argument that any inequality experienced by the Deaf within the
provincial health care system existed independently of the government's actions,
Justice LaForest argued that: "the social disadvantage borne by the deaf is directly
related to their inability to benefit equally from the service provided by the govern-
ment." 77
Justice LaForest also dismissed the respondents' suggestion that benefit-conferring
legislation only offends the Charter where it exacerbates pre-existing disparities
between a disadvantaged group and others. Justice LaForest characterized the
respondents' position "that governments should be entitled to provide benefits to the
general population without ensuring that disadvantaged members of society have the
resources to take full advantage of those benefits" as "a thin and impoverished vision"
of section 15.78 On that basis, Justice LaForest found that the B.C. government's
failure to ensure equal benefit of provincial health programs and services for the Deaf
violated the Charter's equality guarantee.
In its decisions in Vriend and Eldridge, the Supreme Court has affirmed that the precise
form of state action or inaction is not the proper focus of enquiry under section 15.
Rather it is the substantive impact of the government's failure to meet the particular
needs of a disadvantaged individual or group which must be assessed. The Court has
also confirmed that positive government intervention will often be required to equalize
the situation of disadvantaged groups, and that governments cannot avoid their
Charter obligations simply because inequality is deeply rooted in society, or because
no one is worse off than they were before an inadequate or discriminatory social policy
or program was put in place. The Court's approach to section 15 in Vriend and in
Eldridge is fully consistent with the principles underlying the International Covenant,
including with recognition of the state's positive obligation to adopt legislative
measures designed to achieve full and equal realization of social and economic
rights.79
76. Ibid at 677-678.
77. Ibid at 679-680.
78. Ibid at 676.
79. See generally supra note 21; supra note 35; General Comment No. 3, Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, Report of the Fifth Session, UN ESCOR, 1990, Supp. No. 3, UN Doc.
E/1991/23, E/C 12/1990/8; Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 4.
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4. THE CHARTER AS A VEHICLE FOR ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RIGHTS
With the repeal of CAP and the adoption of the CHST, fundamental social and
economic safeguards, including the right to a level of social assistance which meets
basic needs, the right to assistance irrespective of the reasons for the need for support
and the right to appeal unfavourable welfare determinations, are no longer a matter of
entitlement in Canada, but of privilege. The change in the direction and content of
Canadian welfare policy and programs, reflected in and reinforced by the abandon-
ment of CAP in favour of the CHST, violates both the letter and the intent of the
Universal Declaration and the International Covenant.80 The Charter can provide an
important avenue for redressing this situation. In particular, judicial enforcement
of the right to life, liberty and security of the person under section 7 and the right
to equal protection and equal benefit of the law under section 15 can give concrete
meaning and legal effect to Canada's international social and economic rights under-
takings.
An approach to the Charter informed by Canada's obligations under the International
Covenant would, for example, have led to differing analyses in each of the lower court
decisions described above. In Brown,81 the plaintiff's challenge to the discriminatory
under-inclusiveness of B.C.'s pharmacare regime would have been assessed in light
of the right, under the International Covenant, to the highest attainable standard of
physical health82 and to medical care in the event of sickness, 8 3 without discrimina-
tion. 84 In Masse,8 5 the 20 percent cut in Ontario welfare rates would have been
assessed in light of the government's obligation to take steps "to the maximum of its
available resources" to achieve progressively the "full realization" of the rights
recognized under the International Covenant, including the right to social security, 86
to an adequate standard of living,8 7 and to "the continuous improvement of living
conditions.88 In Williams,89 discrimination against public housing tenants under
Newfoundland's residential tenancies legislation would have been examined in light
of the right to adequate housing, 90 without discrimination based on social status. 91 In
80. For further elaboration of the argument that the repeal of CAP violates Canadian Charter and inter-
national human rights principles, see Day & Brodsky, supra note 28; L. Sossin, "Salvaging Welfare
State?: The Prospects for Judicial Review of the Canadian Health and Social Transfer" (1998) 21
Dal. L.J. 141; Jackman, supra note 28.
81. Supra note 52.
82. Supra note 2, Art. 12(1).
83. Ibid., Art. 12(2)(d).
84. Ibid., Art. 2(2).
85. Supra note 53.
86. Supra note 2, Art. 9.
87. Ibid., Art. 11(1).
88. Ibid.
89. Supra note 54.
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Gosselin,92 Qu6bec's discriminatory welfare and workfare regime would have been
scrutinized in light of the right to social security,93 to an adequate standard of living, 94
and to work which one "freely chooses or accepts". 95 And, in Fernandes,96 the
plaintiff's Charter claim with respect to the province's refusal to provide him with
adequate funding for attendant care would also have been considered in light of the
International Covenant's guarantees relating to social security, 97 to an adequate
standard of living, 98 to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, 99
and to equality1o°
Instead of denying the plaintiffs' Charter claims outright the courts would, in each
case, have required governments to justify social and economic rights violations under
section 1 of the Charter, in accordance with the Supreme Court's analysis in the Oakes
case. 101 Only where it could be shown that the plaintiffs' social and economic rights
were violated in pursuit of important governmental objectives; that violation of the
plaintiffs' rights was a rational means of achieving those objectives; and that the harm
to the individual resulting from the rights violation was outweighed by the benefits to
the community, could the government's actions be justified. In other words, consistent
with the text and intent of the International Covenant, social and economic rights
violations would be subject to the same degree of scrutiny as applied to other Charter
breaches. 102
The earlier analysis of the Supreme Court's approach to sections 7 and 15 of the
Charter suggests that there is reason to hope that the U.N. Committee's continuing
exhortations to Canadian courts to interpret the Charter in a manner which gives effect
to international social and economic rights guarantees may yet be heard. With the
Supreme Court's analysis in Eldridge and Vriend, it will be difficult for governments
to continue to successfully assert that they are under no constitutional obligation to
act, even where their inaction results in serious violations of social and economic
rights. The Court's decision in Irwin Toy has confirmed that a proper reading of the
90. Supra note 2, Art. 11 (1).
91. Ibid., Art. 2(2).
92. Supra note 56.
93. Supra note 2, Art. 9.
94. Ibid., Art. I1(1).
95. Ibid., Art 6(1).
96. Supra note 55.
97. Supra note 2, Art. 9.
98. Ibid., Art. 1 (1).
99. Ibid., Art. 12(1).
100. Ibid., Art. 2(2).
101. R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, (1986), 26 D.L.R. (4th) 200, 65 N.R. 87.
102. Consider for example the Supreme Court's rigorous section 1 analysis in R.J.R.- MacDonald Inc. v.
Canada (A.G.), (1995] 3 S.C.R. 199, a case involving limits to the freedom of expression of cigarette
manufacturers under federal tobacco products control legislation.
From National Standards to Justiciable Rights
legislative history of section 7 does not preclude recognition of the social and
economic rights included in the International Covenant, which are essential to human
survival and well-being.
In his Court of Appeal decision in J.G.,103 Justice Bastarache underlined the fact that
the Charter must not only prevent government interference in the lives of citizens, it
must also require government action to ensure that individual rights are fully protected
and realized. In this regard Justice Bastarache pointed to growing international and
domestic acceptance of the fundamental interdependence and permeability of all
human rights, 10 4 and he suggested that this understanding must also be reflected in
Charter interpretation. The "protective and integrative" approach to human rights
described by Justice Bastarache, and given concrete expression in the International
Covenant, recognizes that without access to basic social goods, such as food, shelter
and education, which social and economic rights are designed to guarantee, it is
impossible to derive meaningful benefit from more traditional civil and political
rights. Like the right to speak, to assemble, or to vote, social and economic rights are
intimately connected to the Charter's underlying goal of fostering the dignity and
security of every individual, and of ensuring that each can participate as full and equal
members in Canadian society.
During his testimony as a witness before the Special Joint Committee on the Consti-
tution in its hearings on Bill C-60, then federal Justice Minister Jean Chr6tien asserted
that: "the rights that we have agreed upon in international agreements should be
reflected in the laws or the Charter of Rights that we will have in Canada." 10 5 In
argument before the Supreme Court of Canada in the Qu6bec Secession Reference, 10 6
the federal government asserted that "Canadian constitutional structures are fully in
compliance with" the Universal Declaration and the International Covenant. 107 In its
recent pleadings in Baker v. The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration,10 8 the
103. Supra note 63.
104. For an in-depth discussion of this issue, see C. Scott, 'The Interdependence and Permeability of
Human Rights Norms: Towards a Partial Fusion of the International Covenants on Human Rights"
(1989) 27 Osgoode Hall L.J. 769; see also supra note 60.
105. Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons on the Constitution of Canada,
Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, supra note 67, Issue no. 3 at 28 (12 November 1981).
106. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 161 D.L.R. (4th) 385, 228 N.R. 203.
107. Factuw of the Attorney General of Canada in the Matter of a Reference by the Governor in Council
Concerning Certain Questions Relating to the Secession of Quebec from Canada, Court File No.
25506 (Supreme Court of Canada) p.71, para. 195.
108. Baker v. The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, 25823 (Supreme Court of Canada). The
Baker case involved a challenge by Mavis Baker, a Jamaican citizen employed as a domestic worker
in Canada, to the denial of her application for permanent residence on humanitarian and compassion-
ate grounds, notwithstanding that her deportation would separate her from her Canadian-born chil-
dren in contravention of articles 3, 9(1) and 10(1) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child,
supra, note 22. The case was heard by the Supreme Court of Canada on November 4,1998. For a
summary of the Charter arguments in the Baker case see Charter Committee on Poverty Issues, Fac-
turn of the Intervener Charter Committee on Poverty Issues in Baker v. The Minister of Citizenship
(1999) 14 Journal of Law and Social Policy
federal government conceded that "[i]t is a well-established principle in Canadian law
that domestic statutes should be interpreted so as to avoid, if possible, interpretations
which would put Canada in breach of its international obligations."' 109 Through their
interpretation of the Charter right to life, liberty and security of the person and the
right to equality, Canadian courts can ensure that governments are in fact called to
account domestically for their failure to meet basic needs, for regressive and discrim-
inatory social welfare policies and for other violations of fundamental social and
economic rights guaranteed under the International Covenant.
To accomplish this task, judges will have to break with current practice, which denies
the importance of Charter-based social and economic rights claims and which dis-
misses as inappropriate and illegitimate the pursuit by low-income claimants of legal
redress for the rights violations which most affect them. Judges will have to read the
Charter in a manner which reflects and reinforces, rather than ignores or undermines,
international human rights principles. They also will be required to accord social and
economic rights the same respect granted to other Charter-based claims. Whether and
to what extent Canadian courts are willing to meet the challenge of providing remedies
for social and economic rights violations through Charter review will be a significant
determinant of Canada's future compliance with the Universal Declaration and the
International Covenant. Given the waning commitment of Canadian governments to
the reduction of inter-personal and inter-regional disparities, it will also be a signifi-
cant factor in the shape of the Canadian community in the century to come.
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109. Respondents' Factum in Response to Interveners' Facta in Baker v. The Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration, 25823 (Supreme Court of Canada) p.1, para. 1.
